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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal requires us to decide whether the well-
established functus officio doctrine is still viable in labor 
arbitration cases.  We hold that it is, and agree with the District 
Court that the arbitration award in this case cannot stand.  The 
deference given to arbitration awards is almost unparalleled, 
but not absolute.  An arbitrator’s powers are derived from and 
limited by the parties’ agreement, which is made against a 
background of default legal rules.  Under these default rules, 
once the arbitrator decides an issue, the functus officio doctrine 
prohibits him from revising that decision without the parties’ 
consent.  He can decide other issues submitted by the parties, 
correct clerical errors, and even clarify his initial decision—
but nothing more.   
 
 Verizon brought this action to vacate an arbitration 
award made pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(CBA) between it and Communication Workers of America, 
AFL-CIO, Local 13000 (the Union).  In its Merits Award, the 
Arbitration Board held that Verizon violated the CBA by 
contracting with common carriers to deliver FiOS TV set-top 
boxes to “existing customers” for self-installation, work that 
used to be performed exclusively by Union Service 
Technicians (Workers).  Yet, months later, the Board, under 
the guise of creating a “remedy,” improperly expanded the 
scope of the violation identified in the Merits Award to include 
not only deliveries to both existing and new customers, but also 
the accompanying self-installations.  Such revisions are 
precisely what the functus officio doctrine prohibits.  Thus, we 
affirm the District Court’s Order, vacating the Remedy Award 




the outer bounds of the Merits Award.  The outer bounds were 
the delivery of boxes to existing customers. 
 
 We also hold that the Board improperly awarded 
punitive damages, which the Parties agree are not permitted 
under the CBA.  For this reason, we will affirm the District 
Court’s Order, remanding the case back to the Board to 




 Article 17.01 of the CBA provides that Verizon “will 
maintain its established policies as to the assignment of work 
in connection with the installation and maintenance of 
communications facilities owned, maintained and operated by 
the Company.”1  Article 13 provides that certain grievances, 
alleging violations of the CBA, must be submitted to the Board 
of Arbitration.  
 
 Verizon FiOS is a television, internet, and phone 
service.  FiOS TV was first available in Pennsylvania in 2006.  
TV content enters the home through fiberoptic cables that lead 
into a “set-top box.”   When FiOS launched, a customer could 
obtain, upgrade, or replace a set-top box in either of two ways:  
(1) a Union Service Technician delivered the box to the 
customer’s home and installed it (Option One), or (2) the 
customer picked up the box from a Verizon store and installed 
it herself (Option Two).  In November 2007, Verizon added 
two more options (the mail options) for “adds, upgrades, 
 




downgrades, or swaps” for “existing customers”:  Verizon 
mails the box to the customer’s home (at Verizon’s expense) 
using a common carrier and either (3) the customer installs it 
himself (Option Three), or (4) a Service Technician comes to 
install it for a fee (Option Four).2 
 
 On February 25, 2008, shortly after learning about the 
mail options, the Workers filed Grievance “EXBD-005-08 
Self-Installation of Set Top Boxes,” demanding that “all work 
associated with the set top boxes must be performed by” the 
Workers.3  They alleged that Verizon violated the CBA by 
contracting out Union work to common carriers through the 
mail options.  They did not challenge instore pickup or self-
installation under Option Two. 
 
 On July 7, 2016, the Board issued the Merits Award, 
ruling that the mail options violated Article 17.01.  The Board 
defined the issue submitted as whether Verizon violated the 
CBA by “implementing a process to deliver set top boxes to 
existing customers by common carrier for customer self-
installation.  And if so, what shall be the remedy?”4  It stated 
that “beginning when [FiOS] was implemented,” Service 
Technicians “were assigned to deliver set top boxes that they 
installed,”5 and that common carriers “who do the delivery 
work . . . are getting the advantage of work that is protected by 
Section 17.01.”6  The Board concluded that Workers “who 
have been denied the opportunity to perform the delivery work 
in question are entitled to compensation” and ordered Verizon 
 
2 Id. at 232, 305. 
3 Id. at 405. 
4 Id. at 229. 
5 Id. at 247.   




“to cease and desist from delivery of set top boxes by anyone 
other than” Union employees.7  However, “[t]here [was] no 
record evidence by which to assess how often [Verizon] sent 
out set top boxes to existing customers who wanted a different 
box that they did not want to install themselves.”8  For that 
reason, the Board “referred [the issue of money damages] back 
to the parties for resolution” and retained jurisdiction in case 
the Parties could not agree on a “monetary remedy.”9   
 
 The Parties failed to reach an agreement and submitted 
the remedy issue back to the Board.  The Parties disagreed 
(then and now) about the scope of the “delivery work in 
question” protected by the Merits Award.  Specifically, 
Verizon argued that, under the Merits Award, the protected 
work assignment included only the delivery aspect of the mail 
options, not the self-installation aspect, and that the Merits 
Award allowed any Union employee to deliver the boxes.  
Verizon had tried to comply with the Merits Award by creating 
a new Union position, Assistant Technician, solely to deliver 
set top boxes for self-installation by customers.  The Workers 
argued that, under the Merits Award, any time a box is 
delivered to (rather than picked up by) a customer, the delivery 
and installation are a single work “assignment” protected by 
Article 17.01.  Thus, “unless the customer obtains the box from 
the Company and brings it [home], the Company’s delivery of 
set top boxes, and the installation or maintenance (including 
swaps and upgrades) of those boxes must be performed by” the 
Workers.10  Because the mail options did not cause the 
Workers to fall below full-time employment, they sought 
 
7 Id. at 253. 
8 Id. at 252. 
9 Id. at 252–53. 




backpay at overtime rates. 
 
 On January 10, 2018, the Board issued the Remedy 
Award, agreeing with the Workers that, in the Merits Award, 
it had ruled that both the delivery and self-installation aspects 
of the mail options violate the CBA.  It further held that 
delivery by Assistant Technicians violated the CBA because 
the protected work assignment belonged to the Service 
Technicians.  “[T]o compensate the[] [Service Technicians] 
and to deter future violations of Article 17.01,”11 the Board 
ordered Verizon to pay two hours (the average time to deliver 
and install a box) of backpay for each box shipment delivered 
by mail or an Assistant Technician, equitably distributed 
among the Service Technicians.  Although the Workers sought 
overtime rates, the Board awarded only straight-time rates, 
stating “that there is no firm basis for awarding pay at overtime 
rates” because the Workers “did not lose income as they were 
fully employed at the time.”12  
 
 On January 31, 2018, Verizon filed this action, 
challenging both Awards.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in part13 for Verizon, vacating the Remedy Award 
because it (1) amended the Merits Award in violation of the 
functus officio doctrine and (2) awarded punitive damages.  
The District Court remanded the case to the Board “for 
calculation of a remedy consistent with [its] opinion.”14  The 
 
11 Id. at 269. 
12 Id. at 268. 
13 The District Court granted summary judgment for the Workers to 
the extent that the Board held that delivery by common carrier 









 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
decision to vacate the Remedy Award.15  Because parties 
litigating the validity of an arbitration award have bargained 
for the arbitrator’s judgment, courts may not review the merits 
of the award.16  A court may vacate an arbitration award if “the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.”17  Three limits on arbitrators’ 
powers are relevant here.  First, because “arbitration is a 
creature of contract . . . an arbitration panel has the authority to 
decide only the issues that have been submitted for arbitration 
by the parties.”18  Second, courts must vacate an arbitrator’s 
award if it is “irrational.”19  An award is irrational if it fails to 
“‘draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement’”20 in such a way that it “can[not] be rationally 
derived either from the agreement [or] the parties[’] 
 
15 Kaplan v. First Options of Chic., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
16 Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Pro. Baseball 
Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004). 
17 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
18 Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 
574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005). 
19 Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 
Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 295 (3d Cir. 2010). 
20 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 
1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, 




submissions to the arbitrators,”21 or “the record before the 
arbitrator reveals no support whatsoever for the arbitrator’s 
determination.”22  Finally, although courts must defer to an 
arbitrator’s initial decision, the functus officio doctrine “bar[s] 




A. Functus Officio  
 The District Court found that the Remedy Award 
violates the functus officio doctrine because it expanded the 
protected work identified in the Merits Award by including (1) 
deliveries and self-installations, rather than just deliveries; and 
(2) deliveries to new customers, rather than just “existing 
customers.”  We agree. 
 
 As an initial matter, we reject the Workers’ argument 
that we should abrogate the functus officio doctrine in labor 
arbitration cases.  “Although the doctrine was applied strictly 
at common law . . . ‘the federal courts have been less strict in 
applying the common law functus officio rule in reviewing 
 
21 Ario, 618 F.3d at 295 (last alteration in original). 
22 United Indus. Workers, Serv., Transp., Pro. Gov’t of N. Am. of 
Seafarers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 170 
(3d Cir. 1993); accord Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-
Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union Loc. No. 2-991, 385 
F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004); News Am. Publ’ns, Inc. Daily Racing 
Form Div. v. Newark Typographical Union, Loc. 103, 918 F.2d 21, 
24 (3d Cir. 1990). 
23 Office & Pro. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen. 




labor disputes’”24 after the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 as directing lower 
federal courts to create common law for labor arbitration 
enforcement proceedings.25  Nonetheless, “it has never been 
abrogated by any court of which we have been made aware,”26 
and we hold that it is alive and well in this Court.  The doctrine 
prohibits arbitrators from revising their prior decisions because 
arbitrators “lack[] the institutional protection of judges.”27  
Moreover, the doctrine’s three exceptions give arbitrators 
flexibility to effectuate their contractually-derived powers:   
 
(1) an arbitrator “can correct a mistake which is 
apparent on the face of his award”; (2) “where 
the award does not adjudicate an issue which has 
been submitted, then as to such issue the 
arbitrator has not exhausted his function and it 
remains open to him for subsequent 
determination”; and (3) “[w]here the award, 
although seemingly complete, leaves doubt 
whether the submission has been fully executed, 
 
24 Id. (quoting Teamsters Loc. 312, 118 F.3d at 991). 
25 See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 
U.S. 448 (1957). 
26 Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Loc. Union 824 v. Verizon Fla., 
LLC, 803 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015). 
27 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 331; accord Teamster Loc. 
312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[F]unctus 
officio conceives of arbitrators as ‘ad hoc judges—judges for a case; 
and when the case is over, they cease to be judges and go back to 
being law professors or businessmen or whatever else they are in 
private life.’” (quoting Glass, Molders, Plastics & Allied Workers 
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Loc. 182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 




an ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is 
entitled to clarify.”28  
Moreover, if parties want greater flexibility, they can negotiate 
around the doctrine entirely.   
 
 The Workers do not explain why the doctrine should not 
continue to be the default rule.  In fact, they specifically 
bargained for the doctrine to apply here.  The CBA provides 
that any “arbitration shall be conducted under the Voluntary 
Labor Arbitration Rules.”29  Rule 40 allows “any party” to 
“request the arbitrator . . . to correct any clerical, typographical, 
technical, or computational errors in the award,” but prohibits 
the arbitrator from “redetermin[ing] the merits of any claim 
already decided.”30  Accordingly, the Board’s powers were 
limited by the functus officio doctrine.  As explained below, the 
Remedy Award ran afoul of those limitations. 
 
i Self-Installation 
 Verizon argues that the Board held in the Merits Award 
that self-installation did not violate the CBA and that the Board 
thus could not revisit that issue in the Remedy Award.  The 
record is not clear as to whether the Board decided the self-
installation issue in the Merits Award.  In many instances, it 
 
28 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 331 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 
327, 332 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
29 Appx. 222. 
30 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, LABOR ARBITRATION 






suggested that the self-installation issue was not included in the 
Parties’ submission.  For example, the Board stated that 
“[w]hile the Union views any work, even that done by a 
customer, on a set top box as bargaining unit work, the issue 
before us is whether contracting out the delivery of set top 
boxes to common carriers violates Section 17.01.”31  The 
Board also stated that Verizon’s “focus on customer self-
installation” was “misplaced” because “[t]he Union’s focus is 
on the delivery of set top boxes . . . by common carrier.”32  
Indeed, in their merits brief, the Workers stated that “this 
dispute is not about [Option Two] or who installs the set top 
boxes after they are delivered to existing customers.”33    
 
 In the Remedy Award opinion, however, the Board 
concluded (and the Parties agree) that it had already decided 
the scope of the work assignment, including the self-
installation issue, “in [its] initial decision on the merits of the 
dispute.”34  Indeed, it stated in the opinion accompanying the 
Merits Award that “[t]he question is whether there was an 
established policy in effect at the time of the change as to 
assignment of the installation or maintenance work and the 
delivery of the equipment.”35  Accordingly, we hold that the 
Board did decide this issue in the Merits Award.  Indeed, if the 
Board had concluded that the self-installation issue was not 
within the scope of the Parties’ submission, the Board would 
 
31 Appx. 248. 
32 Id. at 249 (brackets and emphases in original omitted).   
33 Id. at 551 n.7 (second emphasis added). 
34 Id. at 267; see also United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. No. 5 v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981)(“[I]t is 
an arbitrator, and not the court, who is to decide whether the same 
issue has already been resolved in an earlier proceeding.”). 




have exceeded the scope of its authority by deciding that issue 
in the Remedy Award.    
 
 The Workers nonetheless argue that the Board could 
revisit the scope of the work assignment in the remedy 
proceedings for two reasons.  First, the Workers argue that the 
Board reserved the remedy issue and could thus redecide the 
issues addressed in the Merits Award, including the scope of 
the work assignment, either because the Merits Award was not 
a “final award” and the functus officio doctrine did not apply 
to it or because the doctrine’s second exception applied.  We 
disagree.   
 
 By its terms, the doctrine’s second exception does not 
apply.  That exception “authorizes an arbitrator to decide a 
remaining issue which has been submitted by the parties but 
not resolved.”36  Moreover, although we have stated in dictum 
that the functus officio doctrine applies only if the “award [is] 
final, complete, and coextensive with the terms of the 
submission,”37 the existence of the doctrine’s second exception 
implies that the doctrine applies to partial decisions that finally 
resolve some, but not all, of the submitted issues.   
 
However, allowing arbitrators to revisit issues that they 
have already decided merely because they retained jurisdiction 
on ancillary issues—here, the monetary remedy—creates 
several potential problems.  Partial awards are just as 
susceptible as “final” awards to the types of post hoc influences 
and ex parte communications that the doctrine is meant to 
 
36 Teamsters Loc. 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 
1997) (emphases added). 





protect against.  Additionally, an arbitrator could issue a partial 
award as a placeholder to apply settlement pressure, rather than 
just adjudicating the dispute as the parties agreed she would.38    
 
 In any event, even if an arbitrator ordinarily could 
revisit the merits of a partial award, the Board could not do so 
in this case because the Parties narrowed the scope of their 
submission during the remedy proceedings.39  In their brief, the 
Workers submitted only the following issue:  “What shall be 
the appropriate remedy for the Company’s violation of Article 
17.01 of the CBA?”40  The Workers repeatedly treated the 
scope of the work assignment as settled by the Merits Award, 
stating that “the cornerstone of a remedy is the Panel’s Award 
on the merits.”41  Accordingly, the Board was not free to revisit 
the scope of the work assignment. 
 
 Second, the Workers argue that the Remedy Award 
merely clarified an ambiguity about the scope of the work 
 
38 See id. (“The[] exceptions from the functus officio doctrine were 
narrowly drawn to prevent arbitrators from engaging in practices 
that might . . . change a party’s expectations about its rights and 
liabilities contained in an award.”). 
39  Cf. Metromedia Energy, Inc., 409 F.3d at 579 (explaining that 
courts will defer to, but not rubber stamp, arbitrator’s interpretation 
of the issues submitted to it); Trade & Transport, Inc. v. Natural 
Petroleum Charterers Inc., 931 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[I]f 
the parties have asked the arbitrators to make a final partial award 
as to a particular issue and the arbitrators have done so, the 
arbitrators have no further authority, absent agreement by the 
parties, to redetermine that issue.”). 
40 Appx. 950. 




assignment protected by the Merits Awards, under the 
doctrine’s third exception.  Again, we disagree. 
 
 This exception usually arises in determining whether an 
award must be remanded:  Where an award itself is too 
ambiguous to enforce, the court must remand it for 
clarification.42  The Workers argue that because the Board has 
already purported in the Remedy Award to clarify that the 
Merits Award protected all deliveries and accompanying self-
installations, we are required to defer to that “clarification.”  
Not so.  Unflagging deference to arbitrators’ “clarifications” 
would effectively give them the power to revisit the merits of 
prior decisions, thus completely eliminating the functus officio 
doctrine.  Where an arbitrator has actually decided an issue but 
the ruling is ambiguous, we defer to the arbitrator’s post hoc 
interpretation of his award only if it is a rational clarification 
of the ambiguity; otherwise, the arbitrator is revising the 
award, not clarifying it.43   
 
42 Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d at 326; Loc. 719, Am. Bakery 
& Confectionary Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 378 
F.2d 918, 926 (3d Cir. 1967); see also Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Loc. 
8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 754 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982); Bell Aerospace Co. Div. 
of Textron, Inc. v. Loc. 516, Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & 
Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974). 
43 See Gen. Re Life Corp. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 909 F.3d 
544, 549 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining that a supplemental award 
clarifying an earlier award violates the functus officio doctrine 
unless “the clarification merely clarifies the award rather than 
substantively modifying it”); Sterling China Co. v. Glass, Molders, 
Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Loc. No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 556 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he arbitrator’s authority allows for clarification 
of an award subject to multiple interpretations.”); see also SBC 
Advanced Solutions, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., Dist. 6, 794 




 We agree with the Workers that the Merits Award itself 
was ambiguous as to the scope of the protected work 
assignment.  In the award, the Board stated that the Workers 
are entitled to compensation for “the delivery work in 
question,” but did not define that phrase.  The Board also stated 
that “[t]he grievance is granted”44  The grievance, in turn, 
related to “all work associated with the set top box.”45  Yet, 
even the Workers do not contend that the Merits Award 
referred to “all work associated with the set top boxes”:  They 
concede that Option Two does not violate the CBA.   
 
 But we need not decide whether the Remedy Award is 
a rational clarification of these ambiguities in the Merits Award 
itself, i.e., whether “delivery work in question” could be read 
as shorthand for both the delivery and self-installation aspects 
of the mail options, since that “clarification” is foreclosed by 
the Merits Opinion.  Because “arbitrators have no obligation to 
explain their reasons for an award or even to write an opinion 
unless the contract so requires,”46 “mere ambiguity in the 
opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference 
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a 
reason for refusing to enforce the award.”47  Nonetheless, we 
 
v. Gray Const., Inc., 553 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008); Brown v. Witco 
Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 221 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he arbitrator went 
beyond the express scope of the remand order by issuing a 
clarification that essentially reversed the determinations that he 
made in the August 27 Clarification Letter.”). 
44 Appx. 253. 
45 Id. at 230. 
46 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 
1297 (3d Cir. 1996). 




may vacate an award where “it is obvious from the written 
opinion” that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.48  
 
  Here, it is obvious from the Merits Opinion that the 
Remedy Award revised the Merits Award and thus exceeded 
the Board’s authority under the functus officio doctrine.  In the 
Merits Opinion, the Board explicitly stated that either the 
Workers were not challenging the self-installation aspect of the 
mail options or, if they were, “[p]rior awards have confirmed 
that self-installation by a customer does not amount to 
contracting out bargaining unit work.  . . . The question of self-
installation of certain equipment . . . has long been settled.  
Delivery is another matter.”49  Thus, the Merits Award 
 
U.S. 593, 598 (1960); accord Exxon Shipping Co., 73 F.3d 1287, 
1297 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A]n arbitrator’s decision need [not] be . . . 
internally consistent.”); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Broth. of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Loc. 
Union No. 430, 55 F.3d 138, 141–42 (3d Cir. 1995). 
48 Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 
574, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); accord Raymond James 
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Randall v. Lodge No. 1076, Int’l Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace 
Workers, AFL-CIO, 648 F.2d 462, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining 
that court will remand case based on ambiguities in an opinion only 
“once the reasons that are given strongly imply that the arbitrator 
may have exceeded his or her authority under the submission and 
contract”); U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund v. McSkimming, 
759 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1985); cf. M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH 
& Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f the arbitrator’s 
opinion and award, read together, are not ambiguous, the award 
should be enforced.”). 
49 Appx. 249.  The Workers argue that the Board referred only to 
“prior awards” and thus was not ruling on this issue.  We disagree.  




protects, at most, deliveries under Options Three and Four, but 
not self-installations. 
 
 Nonetheless, the Workers argue that because they 
always install the boxes that they deliver, installation and 
delivery were a single work “assignment” before the mail 
options.  The Workers rely on the Board’s statement that they 
“were assigned to deliver the set top boxes that they 
installed.”50  This statement only further undermines their 
argument for two reasons. 
 
 First, the Workers made similar statements in their 
arbitration brief, but did so to show that “delivery is work in 
connection with the installation and maintenance of [a] 
communication facility” and thus can be protected by Article 
17.01.51  Indeed, the Workers specified that the “core work” 
was the “transporting and delivering [of] set top boxes to 
customers premises,” and that “the work . . . is now assigned 
to UPS and other common carrier employees.”52   
 
 
in the context of rejecting Verizon’s arguments about self-
installation, if it was not ruling that self-installation, in some 
contexts, is permitted?  As explained above, the Board ruled on the 
issue of self-installation, and these statements clearly show how it 
ruled on that issue:  “[S]elf-installation by a customer does not 
amount to contracting out bargaining unit work.” 
50 Id. at 247 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. at 555 (emphases added). 
52 Id. at 550–51 (emphasis added); accord id. at 551 (arguing that 
“the ‘basic work’ of delivery continues to be done[] by non-





 Second, if anything, the Board’s statement that the 
Workers “deliver[ed] the set top boxes that they installed” 
suggests that “the delivery work in question” is even narrower 
than Verizon’s proposed interpretation.  Specifically, it 
indicates that the protected work assignment includes 
deliveries only of “boxes that the[ Workers] installed,” not 
deliveries of boxes that others installed.  Under that reading, 
the Merits Award protects only deliveries (and perhaps 
installations) under Option Four, where Service Technicians 
actually did the installations, and thus does not protect any 
deliveries under Option Three, let alone the accompanying 
self-installations.  In fact, Verizon initially argued for that 
interpretation below, and several parts of the Merits Opinion 
support it.   
 
 For example, the Board stated that Verizon must stop 
“mailing the product to customers when the Company is to 
provide the installation or maintenance on a set top box,” and 
that the Board could not issue a monetary remedy because there 
was no evidence about the number of deliveries to “customers 
who wanted a different box that they did not want to install 
themselves.”53 The Board also distinguished this case from an 
arbitration decision (Strongin) that held that mail delivery of 
telephone cords for self-installation did not violate the CSA 
because “delivery of the cords was merely incidental to the 
[self-]installation” and “the Company is no longer routinely 
engaged in installing these cords.”54  The Board explained that 
here, “technicians continue to install some set of the set top 
 
53 Id. at 252 (emphases added). 




boxes . . . . When that occurs, delivery of a box is not 
incidental.”55  Where a box is delivered under Option Three (or 
by an Assistant Technician), Verizon does not “provide the 
installation or maintenance,” and the Workers did not present 
any evidence of customers who chose Option Three despite 
wanting to choose Options One or Four.   
 
 Thus, the parts of the Merits Opinion on which the 
Workers rely, viewed in the context of the entire Opinion, 
undermine their argument.  We need not decide whether the 
Merits Award protects all deliveries under Options Three and 
Four, as Verizon argues, or only deliveries and Union-
installations under Option Four, as Verizon argued below.  
Regardless of which of those two interpretations is correct, 
both of them foreclose the Board’s purported “clarification”:  
The Merits Award does not protect self-installations under 
Option Three.56  Accordingly, it is obvious from the face of the 
Merits Opinion that the Board revised the Merits Award by 
awarding damages for self-installations, and the third 
exception to the functus officio doctrine thus does not apply. 
 
 In sum, the Merits Opinion forecloses the Remedy 
Award’s purported “clarification” of the scope of the protected 
work assignment, and the Board was not permitted to redecide 
that issue merely because it reserved jurisdiction on the 
remedy.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s Judgment 
holding that the Board violated the functus officio doctrine by 
awarding backpay for self-installations under Option Three.  
 
55 Id. (emphasis added).   
56 Because Verizon did not cross-appeal the District Court’s ruling 
that deliveries by Assistant Technicians (but not the accompanying 
self-installations) were protected in the Merits Award, we do not 






ii Existing Customers 
 The Merits Opinion was clearly limited to “existing 
customers,”57 but that term was omitted from the Remedy 
Award.  The Workers quibble over the definition of “existing 
customers,” arguing that the District Court incorrectly limited 
the Remedy Award to “deliveries to customers that were in 
existence when the Union filed its grievance.”58  Not so.  
Neither the District Court nor the Board precisely defined what 
they meant by “existing customers.”59  It is for the Board to 
 
57 See, e.g., id. at 229 (framing issue as whether Verizon violated the 
CBA by “implementing a process to deliver set top boxes to existing 
customers by common carrier for customer self-installation”); id. at 
238 (quoting Workers’ argument that they “were assigned to deliver 
[the] set top boxes to already existing customers”); id. at 249 (“The 
Union’s focus is on the delivery of set top boxes to existing 
customers by common carrier.”); id. at 252 (“There is no record 
evidence by which to assess how often the Company sent out set top 
boxes to existing customers . . . .”). 
58 Appellants’ Br. at 40. 
59 Although the Board never conclusively defined it, the record 
suggests that the term “existing customers” is derived from the 
scope of the mail options, which were allegedly limited to “adds, 
upgrades, downgrades, or swaps” for “existing customers,” Appx. 
305—in other words, “customers who already have a FiOS service.”  
Id. at 230 (emphasis added) (brackets omitted).  But see id. at 252 
(discussing monetary remedy for deliveries “to existing customers 
who wanted a different box . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Verizon 
suggested as much in its Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing 




clarify any ambiguity in the meaning of “existing customers” 
if and when the remedy issue is submitted to it on remand.60  
Regardless of the precise remedial limitations that term 
imposes, the District Court correctly vacated the Remedy 
Award because it did not include that term at all and thus 
expanded the work assignment identified in the Merits Award.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling that the 
Remedy Award violated the functus officio doctrine because it 
was not limited to “existing customers.” 
 
B. Punitive Damages 
 Verizon argues that the Board impermissibly awarded 
punitive damages.  The Workers do not argue that the CBA 
allows the Board to award punitive damages.61  Instead, they 
 
inter alia, the mail options were not available “to new customers 
until years after the grievance in this case.”  Mot. Sum. J. at 11.   
60 As with the self-installation issue, however, any clarification must 
rationally fit the Merits Award and not be foreclosed by the Merits 
Opinion. 
61 Other circuits have created a presumption that punitive damages 
do not draw their essence from a CBA absent an explicit punitive-
damages provision.  E.g., Island Creek Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, United 
Mine Workers of Am., 29 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 1994); Raytheon 
Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (5th Cir. 1989); 
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Loc. 1139 v. Litton 
Microwave Cooking Prod., Litton Sys., Inc., 704 F.2d 393, 395 (8th 
Cir. 1983); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las 
Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1982); Bacardi Corp. v. 
Congreso de Uniones Industriales de P.R., 692 F.2d 210, 214 (1st 
Cir. 1982).  Because the Workers do no argue that the Board was 
permitted to award punitive damages, however, we do not decide 




argue that the Remedy Award was only compensatory.  We 
agree with Verizon. 
 
 Although the Remedy Award and the accompanying 
opinion are ambiguous, they “strongly imply that the [Board] 
may have exceeded [its] authority.”62  The Board stated that it 
sought “to compensate” and “to deter future violations.”63  
Although compensatory damages alone could “deter future 
violations” of the CBA, the goal of deterrence often indicates 
that damages are punitive.64  And although the Board stated 
that the Workers “lost work to which they were entitled,”65 it 
was merely holding that Verizon violated the CBA to the extent 
that it assigned delivery work to Assistant Technicians.  It did 
not make explicit findings that any Service Technicians 
actually lost pay for which they could be compensated.  To the 
contrary, it stated that the Workers “did not lose income as they 
were fully employed at the time.”66   
 
 The Workers argue that, in finding that they “did not 
lose income,” the Board was merely explaining its decision to 
award straight-time rates rather than overtime rates.  The 
Workers are correct that that was the context of this finding, 
but that explanation makes no sense:  Even accepting the 
Workers’ argument that the Board had discretion to award only 
 
62 Randall, 648 F.2d at 468. 
63 Appx. 253. 
64 Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 
(1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to 
compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor 
whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter 
him and others from similar extreme conduct.”). 
65 Appx. 268. 




straight-time backpay for lost overtime work,67 that does not 
explain the Board’s statement that they “did not lose income.”  
That someone was “fully employed” does not mean that he did 
not lose overtime work; to the contrary, it means that if he lost 
anything, it was overtime.  And if he lost overtime, he 
presumably “los[t] income.”   
 
 Ordinarily, we would remand this matter to the Board 
to clarify whether any part of the damages were punitive.  Here, 
however, clarification is not necessary.  If the Remedy Award 
was not at least partially punitive, it would be irrational 
because there was no record evidence supporting 
compensatory backpay for all box shipments.68  It is well 
settled that compensatory damages for breach of contract are 
intended “to put [the plaintiff] in the position he or she would 
have been in had there been no breach.”69  “[T]he non-
 
67 Cf. New Meiji Market v. United Food & Com. Workers Loc. Union 
905, 789 F.2d 1334, 1336 (9th Cir. 1986). 
68 See NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 
759–60 (3d Cir. 1975) (“[I]f an examination of the record before the 
arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his determinations, his 
award must be vacated.”); see also Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany 
Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1972) (vacating 
arbitrator’s bond award as irrational because it exceeded the 
maximum amount of liability supported by the record). 
69 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 
Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir. 2001); accord Brand Mktg. Grp. 
LLC v. Intertek Testing Servs., N.A., Inc., 801 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Compensatory damages ‘are intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.’” (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001))); ATACS 
Corp. v. Trans World Commc’ns, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 




breaching party should not be placed in a better position 
through the award of damages than if there had been no 
breach.”70  Even setting aside the Board’s violation of the 
functus officio doctrine, the Workers have not pointed to any 
evidence that there were Service Technicians able and willing 
to perform any of the deliveries and installations, let alone all 
of them.71 
 
(explaining that “backpay” includes “only an amount equal to the 
wages the employee would have earned” (emphasis added)); 
Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding that “back pay cannot legitimately be claimed” 
where “no present compensation can be expected”); Leeper v. 
United States, 756 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1985) (“A tort victim can 
also recover lost earnings where there has been an actual loss of 
income or an employment benefit.”). 
70 Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 339 F.3d 1341, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 
218, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To prove damages [for breach of 
contract], a plaintiff must give a factfinder evidence from which 
damages may be calculated to a ‘reasonable certainty.’” (quoting 
ATACS Corp., 155 F.3d at 668)). 
71 See Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & 
Energy Workers Int’l Union Loc. No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809, 819–20 
(3d Cir. 2004); Ga. Power Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 
84, 995 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
Aerospace Div. v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 561 F.2d 
521, 523–24 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Leed Architectural Prods., 
Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Loc. 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 66 (2d 
Cir. 1990); Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de 
Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1982); cf. Brentwood Med. 
Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 
2005) (upholding award even though arbitrator impermissibly added 
new language to CBA because “there [was] sufficient substance in 




 Accordingly, the Remedy Award was either punitive or 
irrational.  The District Court thus correctly vacated the 
Remedy Award and remanded the matter to the Board for a 
redetermination of what compensatory damages, if any, are 
appropriate based on the evidence and the scope of the work 
assignment identified in the Merits Award and Merits Opinion. 
 
IV 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
threshold”). 
